WASHINGTON, October 5 — The arrest of a Chinese national accused of spying on the son of Taiwan’s leader raises questions about the distinction between foreign agent charges and espionage under U.S. law. Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), individuals who engage in political lobbying, public relations, or fundraising at the direction of a foreign principal are required to register publicly with the Department of Justice (DOJ). FARA does not ban foreign influence but mandates transparency.
In contrast, 18 U.S.C. § 951, often referred to as ‘espionage-lite,’ is a criminal statute that penalizes anyone acting as an agent of a foreign government without notifying the Attorney General. It is used to prosecute clandestine activities such as information gathering, technology procurement, and other forms of non-traditional espionage.
The Espionage Act explicitly criminalizes the unlawful gathering, transmitting, or losing of national defense information with intent to harm the United States or aid a foreign nation. In February 2025, Attorney General Pam Bondi issued a department-wide charging directive directing prosecutors to restrict criminal FARA and Section 951 charges exclusively to conduct resembling traditional espionage by foreign government actors. Under this policy, routine political influence, corporate lobbying, and public relations activities are steered away from criminal indictment and handled through civil enforcement, regulatory oversight, and public guidance.
The DOJ has emphasized that while the threshold for criminal prosecution is high, covert efforts to shape U.S. policy under foreign direction—such as staging deceptive public demonstrations—still carry severe civil and criminal liabilities if they cross into state-backed influence operations. Historical context shows that following a period of aggressive criminal FARA prosecutions against political lobbyists and consultants, the DOJ pivoted to focus on espionage-like conduct.
The case of Cuban-American ex-Congressman David Rivera, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison for acting as an agent of the Venezuelan government, illustrates how such charges can result in significant penalties when tied to foreign government direction. These legal frameworks collectively define the boundaries between permissible foreign engagement and illicit covert influence in U.S. jurisdiction. Looking forward, the case of the Chinese national will shed light on the current administration’s approach to foreign influence and espionage under U.S. law.
